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ABSTRACT 
VoteBox Nano: 
A Smaller, Stronger 
FPGA-based Voting Machine 
by 
Ersin Oksiizoglu 
This thesis describes a minimal implementation of a cryptographically secure di-
rect recording electronic (DRE) voting system, built with a low-cost Xilinx FPGA 
board. Our system, called VoteBox Nano, follows the same design principles as the 
VoteBox, a full-featured electronic voting system. The votes are encrypted using El-
gamal homomorphic encryption and the correctness of the system can be challenged 
by real voters during an ongoing election. In order to fit within the limits of a minimal 
FPGA, VoteBox Nano eliminates VoteBox's sophisticated network replication mech-
anism and full-color bitmap graphics system. In return, VoteBox Nano runs without 
any operating or language runtime system and interacts with the voter using sim-
ple character graphics, radically shrinking the implementation complexity. VoteBox 
Nano also integrates a true random number generator (TRNG), providing improved 
security. In order to deter hardware tampering, we used FPGA's native JTAG in-
terface coupled with TRNG. At boot-time, the proper FPGA configuration displays 
a random number on the built-in display. Any interaction with the JTAG interface 
will change this random number, allowing the poll workers to detect election-day 
tampering, simply by observing whether the number has changed. 
Acknowledgments 
First, I thank my advisor, Professor Dan Wallach, for his continuous support through-
out my M.S. program. He helped me a lot during the implementation and presen-
tation of "VoteBox Nano" by correcting my speech and slides, teaching the basics 
of academic writing and literature survey. Although we were coming from different 
backgrounds, he accepted me to his security group and gave me a means to continue 
on my research. 
Besides my advisor, I would like to thank the rest of my thesis committee: Pro-
fessor Peter Varman and Professor Kartik Mohanram for their time and valuable 
feedback on my thesis. I also want to thank Professor Farinaz Koushanfar for her 
support, innovative research ideas and her role in my admittance to Rice University. 
Last, but not least, I thank my family: my mother, Fatma Oksuzoglu; my father, 
Gazi Oksuzoglu and my sister, Meltem Oksuzoglu; for their limitless and uncondi-
tional support and encouragement to pursue my interests, even when the interests 
went beyond boundaries of language, field and geography, for listening to my com-
plaints and frustrations, and maybe most importantly for believing in me. 
Some portions of this thesis appeared in Reconfig'08 and EVT/WOTE'09 con-
ferences. This work was supported, in part, by NSF grants CNS-0524211 and CNS-
0509297. 
Contents 
Abstract ii 
Acknowledgments iii 
List of Illustrations vi 
List of Tables vii 
1 Introduction 1 
2 Background 5 
2.1 Commercial voting machines 5 
2.1.1 Hart InterCivic 5 
2.1.2 Diebold AccuVote-TSX 8 
2.1.3 Sequoia Edge 9 
2.2 Proof of concept e-voting machines 11 
2.2.1 Sastry's voting machine 11 
2.2.2 VoteBox 14 
2.2.3 Pvote 18 
2.2.4 Sturton's voting machine 19 
2.3 FPGA security 20 
3 Implementat ion 22 
3.1 Selecting a platform 22 
3.2 Implementation details 23 
3.2.1 Computation 24 
3.2.2 User interface 30 
V 
3.2.3 Random number generation 33 
3.2.4 Modules and design complexity 38 
3.2.5 Programming the FPGA 41 
4 Modeling possible attacks 42 
4.1 JTAG 42 
4.2 JTAG tamper detection 44 
4.3 Verification and other attacks 47 
5 Conclusion and the future work 48 
Appendices 49 
A Cryptosystem details 50 
A.l Elgamal encryption scheme 50 
A.1.1 Key generation 51 
A.1.2 Encryption 51 
A.1.3 Decryption 51 
A.2 Elgamal homomorphism 52 
B Xilinx Spartan-3E F P G A Structure 54 
Bibliography 57 
Illustrations 
2.1 Hart InterCivic eSlate [22] 6 
2.2 Hart InterCivic Judge's Booth Controller (JBC) [22] 7 
2.3 Diebold AccuVote-TSX DRE voting machine 8 
2.4 Sequoia Edge [21] 10 
2.5 Screenshot of the 3 Gumstix boards (taken from Sastry et al. [42]) . . 12 
2.6 The voting machine implementation of Sastry et al. [42] 12 
2.7 Minimalistic user interface of Sastry et al. [42] 13 
2.8 SWATT's attack model 14 
3.1 Processing element (PE) 27 
3.2 Execution graph of the crypto engine 29 
3.3 Screenshot of the VoteBox Nano user interface 31 
3.4 Screenshot of the original VoteBox user interface 31 
3.5 Rotary dial and buttons are used for user inputs 32 
3.6 TRNG with ring oscillators 35 
3.7 TRNG post-processing unit 35 
4.1 JTAG data input is used as a sealing mechanism 44 
4.2 Dot-Matrix Display showing the session ID in the second line 45 
B.l Xilinx Spartan-3E FPGA motherboard and chip structure 55 
B.2 The Xilinx Spartan-3E 500 motherboard running VoteBox Nano. . . 56 
Tables 
2.1 Source code length of each e-voting software 20 
3.1 Measured frequencies with different oscillator lengths 34 
3.2 Slice count and source code length of each FPGA module 38 
3.3 FPGA resource utilization 40 
3.4 C code size 40 
B.l Xilinx Spartan-3E FPGA resources 56 
List of Algorithms 
1 Left to right binary exponentiation 25 
2 CIOS Montgomery multiplication 26 
1 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Voters seem to prefer electronic voting systems [15], and administrators like the speed 
inherent in electronic tallies. Direct recording electronic (DRE) voting systems offer 
many advantages for both the voters and election administrators over precinct-based 
optical scanner systems such as: 
• Faster tally: Official results can be ready on the even same day with much 
less human effort. 
• Lower cost: Although, investing money into DRE voting machines may seem 
to raise the costs initially, following reasons make the DRE machines very af-
fordable in the long run: 
— The lifespan of most DRE machines are quite long and they can be reused 
for many elections. 
— Total number of the personnel (poll workers) required to carry on elections 
are lower. 
— There is no ink cost and paper waste at the end. 
• Security and reliability: Well designed DRE systems can take the advantage 
of the cryptographic functions, so that they can preserve voter's privacy and 
vote's integrity; therefore it is much harder to cheat or expose the votes during 
or after the elections. Additionally, they are more resistant to the attacks by 
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the biased poll workers or errors induced by human factor, because most DRE 
systems are autonomous. Moreover, they can issue real time alarms or warnings 
in case of: 
— An attack to the system, 
— Incorrect/unexpected checksum values, 
— Problems with the user interface or input devices, 
— Connection or power issues, 
— Unhandled exceptions or similar programming errors, etc. 
• Accessibility: DRE systems are easier to use for a large portion of the general 
population because: 
— Many different ballot layouts (e.g. higher contrast schemes , larger fonts) 
and different languages can be adapted very easily. 
— Blind voters can take the advantage of audio support of the DRE voting 
machines. 
— Most DRE systems can warn the voters when they skip a race accidentally. 
— DRE voting systems are able to give visual and/or audible confirmation 
at the end of the voting process, so that the number of the invalid votes 
(e.g. multiple selections in a single selection race) or incomplete votes are 
substantially reduced. 
• Fairness: Most undecided voters are inclined to select the first candidate in a 
given list, so the ordering of the candidates can create an inequality in some 
races; however the DRE machines can shuffle the order of the candidates for each 
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voting session, minimizing this unfair advantage. Moreover, different racing 
schemes (approval voting, range voting, or ranked voting, etc.) can be applied 
according to needs for a more balanced election. 
Unfortunately, present-day commercial electronic voting systems have well doc-
umented security flaws (see, e.g., the California Top-to-Bottom Reports [23, 6, 4]), 
leading many states to consider dumping their electronic systems for paper-based 
voting, often with precinct-based optical scanners; therefore before going into the de-
tails of various voting systems, we should highlight the desired properties of a reliable 
voting system: 
• Eligibility: Only legitimate voters should vote and they should be allowed to 
vote only for once. 
• Universal verifiability: The tallying process and final results should be public 
and everyone should be able to verify the results of the election. 
• Privacy: In a healthy democratic election, the privacy of the voter should be 
preserved by paying attention to the following: 
- Anonymity: It should be impossible to trace the votes back to the voter 
so that the voter will be in absolute freedom. 
— Receipt&xoercion freeness: The voter should not be able to prove to 
someone that he voted for a specific candidate. This is required so that no 
one can buy votes or force someone to vote for his candidate. 
• Fairness: The voting system must treat every candidate absolutely the same. 
• Robustness: The voting system should be reliable against denial of service 
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attacks, power and network problems, partial component failures and it should 
handle invalid inputs appropriately. 
Our research in this thesis is an extension of VoteBox [40], one of many electronic 
voting systems that aim to offer a paperless electronic voting experience, desired 
by many voters and election administrators, while using end-to-end cryptographic 
techniques to verify the correct operation of the voting system. To that end, we 
built a simplified VoteBox-like system, which we call "VoteBox Nano", using a Xilinx 
Spartan-3E 500 Starter Kit. 
The thesis is organized as follows: In Chapter 2, we discuss previous electronic 
voting technologies, followed by a discussion of VoteBox and how it differs from 
VoteBox Nano. In Chapter 3, we describe the implementation of VoteBox Nano, with 
particular attention paid to the implementation of crypto module and true random 
number generator. Chapter 4 considers threats against VoteBox Nano, particularly 
via its JTAG interface, and describes how we provide tamper-detection. We conclude 
and present the future work in Chapter 5. Interested reader can find the details of 
our FPGA platform and the details of Elgamal encryption in the appendices. 
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Chapter 2 
Background 
2.1 Commercial voting machines 
In this section, we will introduce three leading commercial e-voting systems and 
discuss their vulnerabilities. We will take only the DRE equivalent components into 
account, that is, optical scanner based devices are not going to be considered. 
2.1.1 Hart Inter Civic 
Harts DRE voting system can be divided into two groups: 
• On-site device: eSlate (Figure 2.1) is the component which the voter interacts 
with. 
• Election management component: Judges Booth Controller (JBC) (Fig-
ure 2.2) is the central controller of the eSlate networks. 
Both devices cost around $3000 [22] and the software written for the whole system 
consists of approximately 360k lines of source code [23] (mostly C + + and C). The 
eSlates and JBCs are designed to run on an embedded operating system (whose source 
code is not publicly available) on custom embedded hardware. 
A recent independent review [23] lists some of the vulnerabilities of the Hart e-
voting systems as follows: 
• Unsecured network interfaces: The network interface of Hart InterCivic is 
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Figure 2.1 : Hart InterCivic eSlate [22] 
very susceptible to attacks. The communication line can be eavesdropped and 
new votes can be inserted. It is allowed by the design that the poll workers are 
able to connect to JBCs and change the software on the fly using this interface, 
however the same method can be used to take over any eSlate voting device, so 
that any result can be produced regardless of voters' actual intentions. 
• Vulnerability to malicious inputs: The Hart software does not check the 
integrity of the data coming from other devices and uses them "as is", leading 
to unsafe executions. An attacker could easily compromise the whole voting 
system by injecting malicious inputs to the device. 
• Lack of cryptography: In Hart e-voting system, the communication channel 
between devices are generally not encrypted at all, which is quite unexpected; 
as a result the security of the system is drastically reduced. Some components 
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Figure 2.2 : Hart InterCivic Judge's Booth Controller (JBC) [22] 
communicate indirectly through PCMCIA memory cards called Mobile Ballot 
Boxes (MBBs) which are encrypted with a single symmetric key*, which is kept 
in vulnerable polling-place devices, making it easy for an attacker to get the 
key and change the election results for the entire county by forging votes. 
• Failure to protect ballot secrecy: The ballot's secrecy and the voter's pri-
vacy are not well protected in Harts e-voting system. A poll worker or an 
election official can rebuild the order in which the votes were cast and autho-
rized; therefore "who voted for whom" can be revealed easily. Moreover, a 
voter who has temporary access to an eSlate device, can extract all the votes 
cast from the beginning of the voting session. Similarly, he can know the votes 
in the other eSlate devices, if they are connected to the same JBC. 
"only one key for the whole county 
8 
Figure 2.3 : Diebold AccuVote-TSX DRE voting machine 
2.1.2 Diebold AccuVote-TSX 
Diebold is a well known company with their ATMs and other security products such 
as electronic safes, paper shredders, alarms, security cameras, etc. besides e-voting 
systems. Their DRE voting system is called "AccuVote-TSX" (see Figure 2.3) which 
is used together with the GEMS election management system. Although we could not 
find the exact price for AccuVote-TSX; we found a similar product's price "AccuVote-
TS" which is $3,500 per unit (see [8]). AccuVote-TSX ballot station software contains 
around 64k lines of C + + , whereas GEMS management application has 116k lines of 
C + + code [6]. 
Documented flaws [6] of the AccuVote-TSX voting system can be listed as follows: 
• Vulnerability to malicious software: An attacker can install malicious pro-
grams on voting machines or GEMS election management system, disrupting 
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the recording process and as a result he can change the outcome of the elections. 
• Susceptibility to viruses: The Diebold system is also vulnerable to viruses, 
which can easily pass to the networked devices including the GEMS system. 
In the worst condition, one affected machine could spread the virus to all the 
voting machines in a county. 
• Failure to protect ballot secrecy: Diebold AV-TSX records the votes in 
the order they are cast and the poll workers can easily know the order of the 
voters. These two pieces of information together will compromise the secrecy 
of the ballot. 
• Vulnerability to malicious insiders: The Diebold system gives almost infi-
nite authority to the users of GEMS management server; therefore anyone with 
access permit to countys GEMS server can change the ballot definitions or even 
alter the election results. 
2.1.3 Sequoia Edge 
Our last commercial e-voting system is Sequoia Edge (see Figure 2.4). It entered to 
the market in 1999, and used for the first time in 2000 presidential elections [21]. The 
software system contains over 124k of C code. 
Sequoia Edge also suffers from critical vulnerabilities [4] that can change the re-
sults of the election such as: 
• Lack of data integrity check: The Sequoia system has removable media 
input, however the data on the media is not checked against corruption espe-
cially for the devices entrusted to poll workers. Some possible dangers of using 
corrupted input data can be listed as follows: 
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Figure 2.4 : Sequoia Edge [21] 
- The election results are stored on "Results Cartridge" or "MemoryPack" 
and these are not protected against tampering. A corrupted poll worker, 
who has access to those, can change recorded votes or lead to denial of 
service. 
- A corruption in the installed firmware can cause incorrectly recorded votes 
and paper trails. 
• Cryptography: Although Sequoia e-voting system uses crypto functions to 
protect the election results, these functions are often implemented in an ineffec-
tive manner. Most cryptographic functions are weak with known vulnerabilities. 
Moreover, all cryptographic keys are permanently hardcoded in the software, so 
even if only one device is compromised, the extracted key can be used for other 
devices, ruining the whole election. 
• Access Control: The access control mechanism can be easily circumvented, 
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using the weaknesses in WinEDS^. 
• Software Engineering: The software is reported to have a lot of programming 
errors. Some of these include buffer overflows, format string vulnerabilities, and 
type mismatch errors. The code does not show defensive software engineering 
practices needed for high assurance systems. As a result, these errors decrease 
the overall security and reliability of the system. 
2.2 Proof of concept e-voting machines 
In this section, we will discuss various DRE voting projects, each trying to solve the 
most common problems that the commercial DRE voting machines have. 
2.2.1 Sastry's voting machine 
Sastry et al. [42], having similar goals to our project, built a minimal voting device 
using Gumstix (connex 400xm) computing devices (Figure 2.5) which have following 
features: 
• They are considerably cheaper than a commercial electronic voting machine 
($144 for each). 
• They are really small (2 cm by 8 cm). 
• They have an Intel XScale PXA255 processor with a 400 MHz StrongARM core, 
running on 64 MB of RAM and 16 MB of flash. 
t\VinEDS is used on Windows PCs for entering, editing, collecting, and reporting on election 
information stored in a Microsoft SQL Server database. 
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Figure 2.5 : Screenshot of the 3 Gumstix boards (taken from Sastry et al. [42]) 
Figure 2.6 : The voting machine implementation of Sastry et al. [42] 
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Figure 2.7 : Minimalistic user interface of Sastry et al. [42] 
This architecture allowed Sastry to enforce a number of important properties. 
Because distinct hardware components were responsible for different aspects of the 
voting machine, the wires between them could be hand-traced and debugged (see 
Figure 2.6). For example, the vote cast and cancel buttons are hard-wired to the 
computing module responsible for casting a vote. A user cannot be fooled into be-
lieving they have cast a vote, such as by drawing a "cast vote" button on the screen 
that actually does nothing. Likewise, Sastry leverages the ability to reset a piece of 
hardware back to its original boot state. Once a vote is cast, a dedicated reset mod-
ule will blast all the other modules, ensuring that no module can retain state across 
votes. Although Sastry's user interface is minimalistic (Figure 2.7), it still relies on an 
embedded Linux kernel and offers no particular mechanism to verify that the running 
code is authentic. 
To address code tampering, Sastry suggests the use of SWATT [46], which imple-
ments a challenge-response protocol between an external verifier and an embedded 
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Expected memory layout 
Expected 
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Figure 2.8 : SWATT's attack model 
device. The challenges are a function of the contents of the memory. If the embed-
ded device had different code running , even if it keeps the proper code in a backup 
location (see Figure 2.8), then the time it would take to compute the response would 
vary* due to variation in CPU effects such as cache hit rates, or in the amount of time 
it would take to shuffle the contents of memory back to their proper configuration. 
In an FPGA with a soft-CPU, unfortunately, techniques such as SWATT or other 
techniques based around timing computations [45, 44, 20, 17] are easier to defeat 
because the attacker could just build a switch into the FPGA's memory controller, 
allowing the memory to be instantly rearranged to its proper state, exclusively to 
respond to the challenge. Instead, we would rather pursue techniques that leverage 
the structure of the FPGA itself. 
2.2.2 VoteBox 
VoteBox is an end-to-end cryptographically secure e-voting platform developed for 
experimenting with voting security technologies [40]. VoteBox is implemented in 
*In this case, the challenge will fail and we will detect tampering. 
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Java and runs on any PC, MAC, or Linux computer. 
While a complete description of VoteBox is beyond the scope of this work, it's 
important to describe several of the features of the system and explain how we adapted 
or eliminated these features to fit into the limitations of the VoteBox Nano platform. 
The key technical insights in VoteBox are: 
• Pre-rendered user interfaces simplify the graphics subsystem [58]. VoteBox 
does not use a general-purpose graphical widget system or require the use of 
a general-purpose font rendering system. Instead, a separate tool prepares 
PNG files to be copied to the screen along with an XML description of the 
ballot. Due to limited resources in VoteBox Nano's FPGA, we can only support 
character graphics. We still pre-render the user interface as a series of text-
drawing commands. 
• Network ballot replication increases the availability of voting records [41] 
by gossiping every message to every machine on the precinct-local network. 
Messages are all digitally signed, so bogus messages can be trivially ignored. 
Messages include hashes of earlier messages, creating an entangled timeline, 
which makes it difficult for an adversary to modify the past [29, 28]. Even 
if a voting machine has been tampered or destroyed, its records will survive 
in copies on other local voting machines. VoteBox's replication features do not 
require machines to reach any sort of consensus on the proper value of any given 
vote. Instead, any inconsistencies in the ballots, should there be tampering, are 
resolved after the fact using a general-purpose "Querifier" tool [39]. 
In VoteBox Nano, we could not afford a general-purpose network stack and 
data replication scheme. Instead, VoteBox Nano systems communicate point-
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to-point with a precinct controller. VoteBox Nano thus does not have the 
fault tolerance of VoteBox, but it does have the same cryptographic integrity 
properties. 
• Homomorphic ballot encryption allows external observers to tally votes 
independently and ultimately validate the decrypted totals published by election 
officials. VoteBox uses Elgamal encryption § [14], a public-key cryptosystem. 
Each voting machine knows the public key of the election authority and can 
encrypt ballots for the authority to decrypt. The homomorphic property for 
Elgamal, as in any homomorphic cipher, means that we can define an "addition" 
function © that allows any party who knows two encrypted values Ek(x) and 
Ek(y) to compute Ek(x + y) = Ek(x) © Ek(y) without knowing the private key 
corresponding to k or being otherwise required to derive the plaintext of x or y. 
For a ballot with n candidates, there must then be n homomorphic counters. 
In any given ballot, these must be the encryption of either 0 or 1. The entire 
ballot will then be signed by the voting machine, using a conventional digital 
signature, before being transmitted on the network. In this respect, VoteBox 
Nano faithfully implements the same cryptosystem as VoteBox, and thus helps 
guarantee that votes will be counted as they were cast. 
• Ballot challenges solve the concern that the homomorphic counters for any 
given ballot may not represent the intent of the voter, perhaps as a consequent of 
malicious code running on the voting machine. VoteBox adapts a technique from 
Benaloh [3], where the voting process follows the usual series of dialogs. After 
the voter accepts the summary screen, two things happen. First, the machine 
See Appendix A for more information on Elgamal encryption scheme. 
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computes the encrypted ballot, as above, and transmits it on the network. 
Second, the voter is asked whether he or she wishes to "challenge" the ballot 
or "cast" it. If the voter challenges, the machine must reveal the plaintext on 
the network, where everybody can see and verify^. (In the case of Elgamal 
encryption, the actual encryption operation includes a random number. When 
challenged, VoteBox publishes the random numbers used, which is sufficient 
to verify the encryption was correct.) If the voter "casts", then the machine 
announces this fact and erases its internal plaintext. 
Ballot challenges force the voting machine to commit to the ciphertext of the 
vote without knowing whether the voter will actually cast the vote or may 
be deliberately auditing the machine for correctness. If the machine cheats, 
it can then be caught in a legally convincing fashion (e.g., an auditor may 
have witnesses and video cameras). If a normal voter accidentally challenges a 
ballot, or if a malicious VoteBox were to deliberately challenge ballots that the 
voter wanted to cast, those specific ballot will not be counted, this fact will be 
observed by the poll workers who can offer the voter a chance to vote again. 
In this respect, VoteBox Nano faithfully implements the same challenge system 
as VoteBox, and thus helps guarantee that votes will be recorded they were 
intended. 
• Voter's privacy depends on the strength of the cipher and the election au-
thority's key management, as the ciphertext ballots are recorded (and timeline 
entangled) in the order that they were cast. If the election authority's secret key 
got compromised, then individual votes could be decrypted and voter's identity 
^This challenged vote is not included in any election tally. 
18 
could be revealed. Furthermore, the random numbers used as part of the Elga-
mal cryptosystem may offer a subliminal channel in which a malicious voting 
machine might leak information about a voter's plaintext preferences. VoteBox 
offers no particular protection against such attacks. VoteBox Nano, however, 
uses a combination of attestations as the platform's authenticity along with a 
hardware-based true random number generator. Ultimately, our system in this 
work relies on "true" randomness from our FPGA's configuration. An alternate 
approach is to construct a protocol where multiple untrusted machines can col-
laboratively derive good random numbers [18], which could fit in the networked 
communication model of VoteBox, but doesn't match as well to VoteBox Nano. 
This thesis addresses several weaknesses with the VoteBox approach. First, while 
VoteBox's security model protects the integrity of a voter's vote, it does nothing 
to protect the voter's privacy if a VoteBox has been compromised with malicious 
software. Such a VoteBox could simply record the plaintext votes, in the order cast. 
Alternatively, a malicious VoteBox could use the random numbers that are required 
for the cryptographic operations as a subliminal channel to leak information about 
the plaintext. Second, VoteBox has a substantial amount of code, both in its Java 
implementation as well as in the language runtime system and the operating system 
that support it; a smaller system might be less likely to have bugs. This project aims 
to design a VoteBox-like system, with a minimal implementation along with improved 
security properties. 
2.2.3 P v o t e 
Pvote [57] is currently the smallest software (see Table 2.1) written for electronic 
voting machine prototyping. It has only 460 lines of Python which implements the 
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bare minimums of an e-voting application. Pvote tries to reduce its code size as much 
as possible, because "a small program is easier to write correctly and easier to review 
for correctness and it is harder for backdoors and security flaws to go unnoticed" [56]. 
Pvote aims to be the user interface component of a larger system (maybe coupled 
with some end-to-end cryptographic verification mechanism). 
The primary idea that makes Pvote tiny is the "prerendered user interface" which 
is supposed to offer the following advantages: 
• Less security-critical code: As there is a clear separation between voting 
machine software and other less critical components such as ballot preperation 
tool, it is simpler and easier to verify the security-critical part of the code. 
• Less updates to security-critical code: The user interface can be com-
pletely redesigned while keeping the voting machine software the same, which 
increases the reliability of the whole system. 
• Ballot design by professionals: Professional designers (not programmers) 
can prepare the ballots with usability and accessibility in mind; without com-
promising the reliability of the code. 
• Easier to test: Because the "new ballot definitions" are kept in platform-
independent format such as image files, they can be tested by anyone for cor-
rectness before elections. 
2.2.4 Sturton's voting machine 
This is another FPGA based electronic voting machine project by Sturton et al [48]. 
This voting machine implements the bare minimum required for an election using 
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Voting machine Lines of code Language 
Pvote 460 Python 
VoteBox Nano 2759 C, Verilog 
Sastry et al. 5085 C, Java 
VoteBox 14500 Java 
Diebold AccuVote-TSX 64k C + + 
Sequoia Edge 124k C 
Hart InterCivic 360k C++ , C 
Table 2.1 : Source code length of each e-voting software 
a finite-state transducer whose correctness is proved using formal verification and 
systemic testing methods. 
In computer science terms, formal verification is proving (or disproving) the cor-
rectness of the intended algorithms used in a system with respect to a certain formal 
specification (or a property) by mathematical methods. In this work, Sturton et al. 
first defined how each part of the finite-state machine should work and formally ver-
ified its Verilog implementation. They had "design for verification and testability" 
properties in mind throughout their progress; therefore they first derived the needed 
properties to be proved; then designed the system accordingly, so that it would be 
easier to verify. 
2.3 FPGA security 
Wollinger et al. [51] provide a summary of security issues while doing cryptography on 
an FPGA, with a focus on how to maintain cryptographic secrets within the FPGA 
in the face of attacks such as attempts to read out the FPGA's bitstream. If the 
bitstream of the FPGA, itself, is a trade secret, then the ability to read it out could 
well be sufficient to reverse-engineer the logic within it. 
Xilinx and other FPGA manufacturers offer features aimed at preventing these 
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reverse-engineering attacks [27]. To prevent "IP theft," some FPGA chips allow the 
bitstreams that define the FPGA configuration to be encrypted. When the FPGA 
boots, it can access an internal key and use this to decrypt the bitstream. An at-
tacker reading the ciphertext would learn nothing and no queries are available to 
allow an attacker to read the decryption key from the FPGA. Alternatively, Alkabani 
and Koushanfar [1] show how to leverage chip-to-chip variations in their behavior to 
achieve "active hardware metering." The FPGA configuration will now be unique to 
a given chip; moving it to another chip would not yield a functioning implementation. 
These techniques are aimed at protecting the secrecy of the FPGA's bitstream. 
For our voting machine, secrecy is a non-issue. We need to detect tampering, which 
is a different problem. Dutt and Li [12] propose adding "parity groups" to the logic 
blocks within the FPGAs, so changes in any one logic block will cause parity failures 
without corresponding changes elsewhere, which the randomization makes it difficult 
to defeat. Drimer and Kuhn [10] describe a protocol to enable an FPGA to reject 
configuration updates that are undesirable. 
We actually want some form of externally verifiable attestation that validates the 
internal state of the FPGA. Chaves et al. [7] proposes to leverage the "partial recon-
figuration" modes allowed in modern FPGAs to effectively lock down an attestation 
module which can speak for the contents of the rest of the FPGA. Similar approaches 
are taken by other authors [19, 13]. All of these techniques rely on external (compu-
tational) verifiers. We desire unskilled election observers to detect tampering without 
needing computers. Our approach to attestation is described in Chapter 4. 
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Chapter 3 
Implementation 
This section begins with providing reasons for using an FPGA platform and then a 
brief description of our FPGA board is given. Following parts explain each component 
of our design. 
3.1 Selecting a platform 
For any hardware design to survive in today's highly competitive economy, the total 
cost should be as low as possible while satisfying all the design requirements. Modern 
general-purpose CPUs are available at a wide variety of price points, but a computer 
is more than just a CPU. Designers must often decide whether to use off-the-shelf 
special purpose chips, such as graphics processors, whether to emulate such devices in 
software on a general-purpose CPU or engineer custom application-specific integrated 
circuits (ASICs). 
A common rule of thumb is that the ASICs are only economically viable if over 
a million will be manufactured. In the case of a voting machine design, it's unlikely 
that there will ever be sufficient demand for such a large volume of custom parts. 
In such circumstances, FPGAs have grown in popularity for a variety of reasons. 
They contain a variety of hardware resources and allow the designer to connect them 
together with great design flexibility. Modifying an FPGA's firmware configuration is 
no more difficult than recompiling and reloading software on a traditional computer. 
Modern FPGAs are sufficiently large and fast as to be able to implement "soft CPUs" 
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and a variety of other resources. They are also valuable for prototyping designs 
that will later be moved to custom ASICs, allowing designers to get a design right 
before investing the resources to produce the ASIC (Kuon and Rose [26] discuss these 
tradeoffs in more detail). 
To implement our design, we used a Xilinx Spartan-3E 500 Starter Kit (see Ap-
pendix B), which is widely available and one of the cheapest platforms. Currently, the 
development board is around $150 and the chip (XC3S500E-4FGG320C) is around 
$31 [53, 2]. When purchased in larger quantities, prices will be significantly lower. 
3.2 Implementation details 
In the process of shoehorning VoteBox into our Xilinx Spartan-3E 500 starter kit, 
we had to make a number of design decisions to simplify the system. Of course, the 
resources available on a Xilinx Spartan-3E are far fewer than on a general-purpose 
computer; therefore we cannot afford the logic for a general-purpose graphics frame 
buffer, and instead, we used character graphics. Likewise, we have limited on-board 
storage, so we could not implement the replication features of VoteBox. Instead, 
a VoteBox Nano client would be tethered to its supervisor console, which would 
then record the votes. We initially considered implementing the VoteBox application 
purely on the hardware. This would have been error-prone and unwieldy, instead our 
implementation combines off-the-shelf modules, such as Xilinx's "MicroBlaze" soft-
CPU core, with custom logic for fast cryptography and for generating truly random 
numbers. The VoteBox Nano application, itself, is written in C and runs on the 
MicroBlaze processor. 
Much like writing software, an FPGA designer does not need to start from scratch, 
but can instead use libraries provided by third parties. In particular, we leverage the 
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MicroBlaze [52] 32-bit soft processor core into our design which is a RISC-based engine 
with 32 registers (implemented in slice RAM), with separate instructions for data 
and memory access. It supports both on-chip BlockRAM and/or external memory. 
Moreover, it can be customized for particular operations by adding a barrel shifter, 
a faster divider, 32 bit or 64 bit hardwired multiplier, a floating point unit, and so 
forth. The sizes of instruction and data cache can be adjusted independently. 
MicroBlaze with hooks make it easy to access custom logic elsewhere in the FPGA. 
This allowed us to re-implement a simplified VoteBox in a straightforward manner, 
which allowed faster compile and easier debug. 
3.2.1 Computation 
We didn't want to rely on the soft-CPU for the heavy-weight modular exponentiation 
required for Elgamal crypto system. With a ballot having 30 or more issues, each 
requiring the encryption of two or more counters, slow cryptography could well be 
noticeable by the user, therefore we decided to use our own crypto engine which 
runs purely on hardware and performs all modular multiplication and exponentiation 
operations. This crypto engine is a modified version of our previous work [35]. In 
the original design, we implemented features (such as modulus blinding, fixing the 
execution time regardless of the inputs, checking for weak keys) against advanced side 
channel attacks, however for this project, we tried to make the crypto engine as small 
as possible, while still providing enough performance. 
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3.2.1.1 Modular Exponentiation 
For modular exponentiation, we used the "left to right binary method" (also called 
square and multiply algorithm) which is described in Algorithm 1*. This algorithm 
requires thousands of modular multiplications , which are the speed bottleneck of 
many Public key Cryptosystems (PKC). In a direct implementation, this operation 
alone can be very demanding on hardware resources because of the prohibitively 
expensive multiplication and subsequent division operations; however we can decrease 
the design complexity by the use of Montgomery [32] multiplication algorithm, which 
avoids costly* "trial division". 
Our chip has dedicated multipliers in hard logic; therefore we needed a "multi-
precision" Montgomery algorithm to take the advantage of these fast multipliers. 
For that reason, we took a software optimized algorithm called CIOS [25] which 
is "coarsely integrated operand scanning" (see Algorithm 2) and parallelized it for 
efficient hardware implementation. 
Algorithm 1 Left to right binary exponentiation 
Requ i re : n > 0 and x ^ 0 
n = (n s_i ,n s_ 2 , . . . ,n 1 ,n 0 ) 
Ensure : y — xn 
1: y<=l 
for i = s — 1 to 0 do 
if rii == 1 then 
y <^y x v 
y 4= y x x 
else 
y <=y x y 
end if 
end for 9 
*The algorithm works the same way for modular arithmetic. 
Un terms of both chip area and execution time 
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Algorithm 2 CIOS Montgomery multiplication 
Require: n > 0 and a ^ O and 6 ^ 0 
s = total number of words in each operand (a,b,n) 
w = bit length of each word (i.e. 16 bits for this case) 
a = (a s _i ,a s _ 2 , . . . , a i ,a 0 ) , b = (bs_u 6S_2,..., h, b0), n = (n s_i,n s_2 , ...,ni,nQ) 
k = \log2n\ where 2k~1 < n < 2k 
UQ1 = Least significant word of multiplicative inverse of n in mod 2k 
C,S,m = w-bit registers and {} is used for bitwise concatenation. 
t = (ts+i,ts, ...,ti,to) = results register (initialized to 0 at the beginning) 
Ensure: t = a x b x 2~k 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
for i = 0 to s — 1 do 
C4=0 
for j = 0 to s — 1 do 
{C,S} <= tj + aj- x &i + C (multiplication loop) 
tj<=S 
end for 
\ts+l, ts} <= ts + C 
m<=tQx ( - n" 1 ) mod 2W 
{C, 5} 4= t0 + «o x m 
for j = 1 to s — 1 do 
{C, 5} 4= tj + rij x m + C (modular reduction loop) 
t j_i 4= 5 
end for 
{C, S}^ts + C 
ts-i 4= S 
ts <= ts+i + C 
end for 
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Figure 3.1 : Processing element (PE) 
3.2.1.2 The details of the crypto engine 
We have two major loops in Algorithm 2: the multiplication (step 4) and the reduction 
phase (step 11). As these loops can be parallelized, we decided to put both of them 
into the same processing element (PE); as a result, each PE is made out of two 
multipliers, two adders and six registers (Figure 3.1). 
The execution graph of the crypto engine (with two PEs) is shown in Figure 3.2. 
Once PE0 generates the first word of the intermediate result t0 (i.e. the least signif-
icant word), the next processing unit (PEX) concurrently starts the computation for 
the second iteration of the loop with the values it obtains from PE0. When a PE fin-
ishes the computation of an iteration, it is immediately assigned to the next available 
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iteration. The results of the last PE are captured in dual-port Block-RAM, which, 
at the same time, feeds the first PE in its assigned cycle, to ensure a continuous data 
flow and maintain high resource utilization. The level of parallelism can be increased 
by putting more PEs in a serial fashion. 
Before the execution of each iteration of the loop (at each increment of the loop 
counter "i"), the value m must be calculated as shown in Step 8 in Algorithm 2. The 
multiplication with m makes the intermediate result's least significant word zero, 
so that we can shift right "radix" bits without losing information. (The value of 
HQ1 is calculated offline (only one word) and fixed as long as the modulus does not 
change). However, meanwhile, other PEs are still performing multiplication operation 
and to maintain a continuous data flow, we need to insert FIFO buffers (not shown 
in the execution graph) among the PEs and compensate for the time lost by this 
pre-calculation step. This will create an irregularity in the algorithm, which makes 
the control circuit more complex. 
As only one word can be requested from each Block-RAM per clock cycle, only 
the first PE directly receives data from the Block-RAM; and similarly only the last 
PE writes the result words (U) to the Block-RAM. Therefore, the general data flow is 
cyclical, that is, all PEs forward their output (the sum S) to the next PE if available 
or to the Block-RAM and all PEs use their own carry values (C) in the next cycle. 
Additionally, PEs forward "used input variables" (i.e. a,j and rij) to the next PE to 
exploit data reuse and simplify connection network. The remaining variable (6j) is 
assigned to the PEs at the beginning of the each iteration of i. 
We could fit 4 PEs into our design and utilized eight 16x16 bit multipliers in 
parallel, which provides sufficient performance while having a low slice count. Our 
multiplier circuit runs at 100 MHz (whereas the MicroBlaze soft CPU and other mod-
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Figure 3.2 : Execution graph of the crypto engine 
Dual Port 
RAM 
ules in the design run at 50 MHz) and performs one 1024-bit modular exponentiation 
operation in 20 ms on average. As the one clock is an exact multiple of the other, the 
edges are aligned and there are no timing and communication issues. 
Our crypto engine is designed to be parametric, so we can make adjustments to 
meet the application requirements and utilize a given FPGA efficiently by changing 
the following three parameters at the compile time: 
1. Number of PEs: Total number of PEs is the main area vs. performance trade-
off metric. The engine must have at least two processing elements since the first 
and last processing elements are hardwired to RAM. There is diminishing rate 
of returns in using more PE's, that is, one cannot make the design any faster by 
adding more PE's after a certain point, which changes with the operand size. 
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2. Radix (w): This parameter determines the bit length of the hardwired mul-
tipliers and adders shown in Figure 3.1. As the radix is closely related with 
the maximum combinational path delay, it has a direct effect on the frequency. 
Radix is parameterized to take the full advantage of the block multipliers in a 
given device to achieve the best performance. 
3. Number of words (s): The radix and the number of words in each operand to-
gether determine the bit-length of the operands; e.g. for 2048-bit operands and 
16 bit radix, the number of words is 128. The number of words also determines 
the depth of the Block-RAM. 
3.2.2 User interface 
We initially wanted to implement a general-purpose, full-color frame buffer. It quickly 
became apparent that this would consume too much RAM and considerable chip 
real-estate, particularly if we wanted a reasonably high screen resolution. Instead, 
we adopted an off-the-shelf character-graphics module [37] which can display 80x60 
characters at a time in any of 8 colors. This module outputs an analog VGA signal 
at 640x480 pixels. (There is no DVI output on our board, so there is no easy way to 
directly drive a digital monitor.) Figure 3.3 shows the VoteBox Nano in action. While 
certainly not as visually attractive as a color bitmap graphics system, particularly for 
supporting non-Latin character sets, this design eliminates the need for any graphics 
libraries. 
For user input, we used the on-board rotary dial and buttons (see Figure 3.5). 
The dial gives us one-dimensional navigation through the user-interface. One button 
then allows the user to mark the currently selected item on the screen. 
The VoteBox Nano is designed to be visually similar to the original VoteBox (see 
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Figure 3.5 : Rotary dial and buttons are used for user inputs 
Figure 3.4), although they use different ballot definitions. The ballot definition file 
used by VoteBox Nano has X, Y coordinates and the color of the text shown on each 
screen, simplifying the GUI code substantially. Both the ballot definition file and the 
crypto setup are supplied to the FPGA immediately after it boots, making it difficult 
to cheat even with a compromised machine. The advantages of having pre-rendered 
GUI are covered by Yee et al. [57]. 
As discussed in Section 2.2.2, the progression of the VoteBox Nano user experience 
mimicks that of the full VoteBox. The voter is presented with one screen per race. 
After selecting a candidate, the voter can advance to the next page. At the end, 
the voter is shown a summary screen from which any particular race can be directly 
selected, giving the voter an opportunity to correct errors. If the voter indicates that 
the ballot is correct, then the encrypted values for every race are written to the serial 
port. The voter then receives one final question asking if they wish to challenge the 
ballot or cast it. If they cast the ballot, this is noted on the serial port and the 
voting session is complete. If they challenge the ballot, all of the random numbers 
used in the cryptography are written to the serial port. This allows an auditor to 
decrypt the votes and validate that the voting machine is not tampering with them. 
This process is very similar to the VoteBox's ballot challenge mechanism, based on 
Benaloh's design [3]. 
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3.2.3 Random number generation 
Every Elgamal-encrypted ballot requires a distinct random number. If the algorithm 
for random number generation is weak, the numbers could be predicted (or forced 
to a certain value) by an adversary, compromising the ciphertexts. Clearly, a voter's 
privacy relies on the unpredictability of the random numbers. 
As we are using an FPGA, we can generate truly random numbers, not just 
pseudo-random sequences. To accomplish this: 
• The implementation must be purely in digital domain for practicality and reli-
ability. So external clocks or any analog components must be avoided. There 
is an analog-to-digital converter on our board which can be used as an entropy 
source, however its behavior will vary as the environment changes. 
• There are several algorithms that utilize coupled oscillators for random number 
generation [47, 34]. However, they will run correctly only if the oscillators are 
implemented with phase locked loops (PLLs). Our target board, the Xilinx 
Spartan-3E 500, only has a Delay Locked Loop (DLL) based oscillator, so these 
algorithms will not work. 
• The algorithm must provide random bits with a reasonable speed, while main-
taining a very low slice count. We cannot afford to spend much chip real-estate 
on random number generation. 
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1=3 
250 MHz 
1=5 
155 MHz 
1=7 
106 MHz 
1=9 
81 MHz 
1=11 
69 MHz 
1=13 
59 MHz 
1=15 
52 MHz 
Table 3.1 : Measured frequencies with different oscillator lengths. 
3.2.3.1 Random generator implementation 
Given the constraints above, we chose to implement Schellekens et al. [43]'s circuit 
for true random number generation (TRNG). The circuit consists of ring oscillators, 
running at frequencies with small differences. Our entropy source is the jitter of each 
oscillator. 
Figure 3.6 shows our noise source. Here / denotes the number of the inverters 
in each ring, k is the number of ring oscillators, n[t] is the noise, fs is the sampling 
frequency, s[t] is the digitized noise. The XOR gate at the end harvests the jitter 
entropy, so even if only one of the k oscillators provide real random output, the 
final outcome will be random. Schellekens claims that using shorter oscillator rings 
(e.g., / = 3) will result in more jitter per period and will therefore have a higher 
entropy; moreover it will decrease the area requirements of the circuit. We also 
confirmed that shorter rings have less stable frequencies which we directly measured 
with an oscilloscope (see Table 3.1). In their minimal design, Schellekens uses 110 
ring oscillators; our implementation has 128 to be safe while still maintaining a small 
area. The flip-flop latches the output of the XOR tree at 25 MHz. 
Subsequently, every TRNG needs a post processing unit (see Figure 3.7) to in-
crease the entropy by decreasing the bias in the random bits. With two shift registers 
of different size (again borrowing from Schellekens, the first shift register is 240 bits 
and the second register is 16 bits), we compress the output of the random number 
generator to increase the entropy at the cost of decreasing the throughput. The XOR 
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taps of the first register are selected according to [256,16,113] cyclic code [11]. For 
the first 240 cycles, the second register is disabled and the first register is filled en-
tirely with the random bits from the source. In the next 16 cycles, we continue to 
feed the first register, while the second register is filled with the XOR output of the 
first register. At the end of the 256t/l cycle, the random word (16 bit long) r[t] is 
ready. This means our TRNG outputs random bits at around 1.56 Mb/s. For each 
new random word, used bits will be replaced entirely with the new ones, ensuring a 
stateless machine. 
In our implementation of Schellekens's TRNG, we have to violate two well known 
digital design rules: First, we create combinational loops and second, we insert re-
dundant elements to the circuit (having multiple inverters in the same path). To 
overcome these problems in the regular design flow, we have to instantiate Look-Up 
Tables (LUT primitives) as inverters in the Verilog source code, and manually place 
them into the FPGA in a pre-defined fashion using the user constraints file (UCF), 
so that each ring oscillator has similar path delays. Moreover, we have to prevent the 
Xilinx synthesis tool from optimizing away the seemingly redundant gates. 
3.2.3.2 Randomness evaluation 
As the TRNG is a critical component in our design, we want to make sure that it is 
unbiased and unpredictable. To evaluate the strength of our TRNG implementation, 
we captured 860 MB of its output for subsequent analysis. 
We first analyzed our random data with the DIEHARD [30] random test suite, 
which has 15 internal tests. The output of each test is normalized into one or more 
p-values that should be distributed uniformly between 0 and 1. If any of them yield 
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a p-value that's very close* to extremes (i.e. 0 or 1), then that would indicate of a 
problem. In practice, our TRNG passed all of these tests. 
DIEHARD has not been updated since 1997. We then used Dieharder [5], which 
is more comprehensive and up-to-date. The Dieharder suite is composed of 107 tests 
and provides four different scores for each test (passed, possibly weak, poor, failed). 
We got 102 "passed," 3 "possible weak" and 2 "poor" from the test suite with the 
default parameters. The reason why our extracted random data could not pass all 
the tests is the larger data size requirement of these tests. In one case, a test rewound 
our sample file 20 times, which of course affects the outcome. When we changed the 
parameters to avoid this rewinding, we passed every test. 
We then used ENT [50] application, which conducts a variety of statistical analysis. 
Its results can be summarized as follows: 
• Entropy = 8.000000 bits per byte. 
• Optimum compression would reduce the size of this 880477629 byte file by 0 
percent. 
• Chi square distribution for 880477629 samples is 255.63, and randomly would 
exceed this value 47.71 percent of the times (numbers near 50% are very random, 
while numbers close to 0% or 100% are not random). 
• Arithmetic mean value of data bytes is 127.5016 (127.5 = random). 
• Monte Carlo value for Pi is 3.141483357 (error 0.00 percent). 
• Serial correlation coefficient is -0.000028 (totally uncorrelated= 0.0). 
*up to six digits of accuracy 
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Module 
Crypto accelerator 
MicroBlaze CPU 
DDR-RAM interface 
Random numbers 
VGA 
RS232 
Debug 
Dot-matrix display 
Push buttons 
Rotary knob 
Other modules 
Total 
Slices 
2119 
1390 
1103 
637 
352 
151 
142 
115 
64 
35 
1687 
7795 
HDL 
lines 
760 
N/A 
N/A 
132 
2297 
1228 
1177 
150 
35 
52 
N/A 
5831 
Custom 
lines 
760 
0 
0 
132 (HDL) 
+ 388 (UCF) 
281 
0 
0 
150 
0 
52 
N/A 
1763 
Table 3.2 : Slice count and source code length of each FPGA module. 
As a final test, we attempted to compress the output of our random number 
generator with the gzip and bzip2 compression utilities, using the "-9" flag to get 
the best possible compression. Both utilities yielded output larger than the input 
(0.016% larger for gzip and 0.44% larger for bzip2). 
All these tests suggest that our TRNG is doing a good job of generating random 
numbers. 
3.2.4 Modules and design complexity 
For the design of VoteBox Nano, we took advantage of the off-the-shelf modules 
provided by the Xilinx Platform Studio (XPS) tool and the OpenCores collection. 
For more specialized operations, we wrote our own modules and attached them to 
the system. 
Table 3.2 describes the FPGA space requirements of each module and how many 
lines of hardware description language (HDL) code we had to change to adapt the 
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module for VoteBox Nano. (Modules we implemented ourselves will have the same 
number of lines modified as present in total.) We did not need to modify the source 
code of standard modules like the MicroBlaze CPU and its debugger, the DDR-RAM 
controller, RS232 communication module and push button controllers. However we 
needed to remove the CPU's instruction and data caches to fit the entire design into 
our FPGA chip. For the security and performance critical components, such as the 
modular exponentiator and TRNG, we wrote our own code from scratch. We similarly 
needed to write our own drivers for the rotary controller and the LCD dot matrix 
display. For VGA output, we modified an off-the-shelf module [37] by changing its 
bus structure to make it compatible with our design and fine-tuning it to reduce its 
area requirements. For our TRNG, as discussed in Section 3.2.3.1, we had to design 
the logic (with HDL) and create a user constraints file (UCF) to defeat the place and 
route (PAR) tools. 
The overall device usage is shown in Table 3.3. Note that the total slice count is 
less than the sum of the slices that each module requires (see Table 3.2), because the 
modules do not always fully utilize the slices. The Xilinx synthesis tools will allow 
separate modules to share resources within a given slice. 
Aside from the FPGA configuration, we needed to write C code for the MicroB-
laze CPU to navigate through the user interface and orchestrate the steps of the 
voting machine. The MicroBlaze CPU, even without caches, is sufficiently fast for 
our performance needs, particularly given that the slow cryptographic operations are 
handled in custom hardware. 
Table 3.4 shows the amount of C source code written for each major function 
of VoteBox Nano. The GUI functions are used to interact with the VGA display. 
We similarly needed a wrapper to operate our modular exponentiation (crypto) unit. 
Resource Used Total Used % 
Slice 
Slice Register 
Slice LUT 
Hardwired Multiplier 
Block RAM 
4482 
5060 
6760 
12 
15 
4656 
9312 
9312 
20 
20 
96 
54 
72 
60 
75 
Table 3.3 : FPGA resource utilization. 
Code Segment 
GUI functions 
Ballot read/write 
Crypto 
DSA 
State machine 
Total 
LOC 
86 
169 
215 
205 
321 
996 
Semicolons 
47 
99 
155 
159 
220 
680 
Table 3.4 : C code size. 
We wrote our own code for DSA, in which we used an off-the-shelf SHA1 function 
written by Niyaz [33], and an MPI (multi precision integer) library implemented by 
Fromberger [16] for performing operations beyond the modular multiplication, which 
we support in hardware. A modest 321 lines of code implements the bulk of the 
VoteBox Nano state machine. The resulting machine code is approximately 122 KB, 
including all the necessary library support. The motherboard includes 32 MB of 
DRAM, which provides ample room for our heap and stack segments, which will 
grow linearly in total with respect to the number of races. 
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3.2.5 Programming the F P G A 
There are two methods for loading a bitstream, using the JTAG§ port to directly 
program the chip and uploading the bitstream to a Flash RAM chip, also through 
JTAG, and setting the on-board jumpers such that the FPGA boots from the onboard 
Flash. 
One useful property of our Spartan-3E chip is that we can issue JTAG commands 
while the chip is still running. This allows us to stop and restart the chip and to read 
and modify the configuration of both the FPGA and surrounding memory chips. The 
"debugger" inside the MicroBlaze soft CPU [52] uses this functionality to remotely 
inspect and modify the machine's state. 
Some more advanced FPGA chips (such as the Xilinx Virtex-5 series, but not the 
chip we use in this work) can alter a part of their configuration, while the chip is still 
active, so that a hardware module (which is not needed anymore) can be substituted 
with another, which results in a dynamic configuration increasing the efficiency of the 
chip usage. This property is called module-based partial reconfigurability. If Vote-
Box Nano were to be ported to such an FPGA, this functionality would potentially 
complicate the security of the design. We will discuss our approach to security in 
Chapter 4. 
§ Joint Test Action Group (JTAG) is the common name used for the IEEE 1149.1 Standard 
Test Access Port and Boundary-Scan Architecture, used for test access ports on printed circuit 
boards to talk to the individual chips. More details at Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ 
Joint.Test-Action.Group 
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Chapter 4 
Modeling possible attacks 
Threat modeling for a system like VoteBox Nano is an unusual task. Given the end-
to-end cryptographic mechanisms, we're confident that we can detect a corrupted 
machine that is trying to attack the integrity of the votes. The threat analysis that 
appears in the original VoteBox paper [40] applies to VoteBox Nano as well. 
Consequently, this work will consider the threats that the original VoteBox made 
no attempt to address: the attacks on the privacy of the voter. These could involve 
tampering with the random number generation, so that an adversary could predict the 
random numbers and decrypt the ballots. Other possible attacks are encoding voter's 
preferences directly into the random number itself, or leaking information about the 
vote by other means (e.g., by flashing the LEDs). We could also imagine that a clever 
attacker might try to modify the user interface behavior in an attempt to confuse the 
voter. Any such attack would require tampering with the FPGA configuration or the 
software running on the soft CPU. As discussed in Chapter 2, we fundamentally need 
a mechanism that can attest to the correctness of our system. Unlike other attestation 
architectures, however, we want our attestation mechanism to be directly visible to 
the voters and poll workers. 
4.1 JTAG 
Rather than using a dedicated Trusted Platform Module (TPM [49]) circuit (although 
one could certainly be used here as well), we arrived at a much simpler solution that 
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works perfectly for VoteBox Nano, even though it may not be generally applicable to 
other FPGA attestation problems. 
We observe that any attempt to reconfigure the FPGA fundamentally requires 
using the JTAG interface, either directly from the JTAG pins on the motherboard 
or through the USB management port. JTAG commands are used to initialize the 
FPGA's configuration and to load the software for the soft CPU. In short, JTAG can 
do just about anything, including being a vector for security attacks [24]. Rather 
than trying to disable the JTAG interface and lock down the FPGA configuration, 
either in whole or in part, we instead want to ensure that we can detect whether any 
JTAG commands have been issued during the election day, and we want to be able to 
use JTAG's ability to extract the state of the FPGA as a mechanism to validate that 
its state is correct. In fact, we could imagine a commercial VoteBox Nano system 
extending the JTAG pins outside the box, to where they could be accessed without 
requiring the case to be opened. 
If we allow that our attacker may access the JTAG pins, then we clearly must be 
able to detect when this has occurred. At that point, why not have our threat model 
allow for the attacker to modify the hardware arbitrarily? It's certainly the case that 
an attacker could substitute a different board inside the voting machine that looks 
like the original with an evil FPGA chip; such an altered system could externally 
appear unmodified, yet it could ignore or emulate the JTAG commands it receives. 
An alternative attack can target the off-chip memory that stores plaintext vote array, 
because it is pretty much vulnerable to any external probing attacks. 
For purposes of this work, we're willing to posit that an attacker is only capable 
of soft attacks. Our attackers may well connect to any external connector and issue 
commands or eavesdrop on serial port traffic, but they cannot eavesdrop on internal 
44 
TDi:(Test: Data In) 
TDO;(Test Data Out) 
TCK: (Test Clock) 
TMS: (Test Mode Select) 
The line is tripwire'd ^^ 
to the Session ID 
Figure 4.1 : JTAG data input is used as a sealing mechanism 
chip buses, desolder and replace chips, or physically damage the hardware. This is 
probably a reasonable assumption, since attackers want to make sure they don't leave 
behind any physical evidence of their attacks. Any detection of hardware modifica-
tions would undermine the effectiveness of an attack. (Also, we note that every chip 
on our board is surface mounted; so replacing a chip requires specialized equipment.) 
4.2 JTAG tamper detection 
Our Xilinx motherboard has an onboard LCD display which can show two rows 
of 16 characters at a time. In a production VoteBox Nano, this secondary display 
could be mounted such that it's visible to the voter. When the system is reset, our 
configuration will generate a random number (session ID) and place it on the LCD 
display. Similarly, every time a JTAG command is processed, we will get a new 
session ID shown on the LCD display, because we were able to hook into the JTAG 
input pins, triggering our own logic when commands are sent (see Figure 4.1) . The 
random number appears on the bottom line of the display in Figure 4.2. 
When the VoteBox Nano is powered on for the day, there may be some JTAG 
commands sent by the supervisor to initialize the voting machine, but after the ini-
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Figure 4.2 : Dot-Matrix Display showing the session ID in the second line 
tialization is complete, the machine should be powered up and running by itself all 
day with the same, exact random number displayed. Poll workers can periodically 
inspect the machines to verify that, in fact, the same number is being displayed as 
was there in the morning. (A production system would also include some kind of 
battery backup to ensure that power failure does not compromise the system.) 
Naturally, an attacker using the JTAG commands could reconfigure the FPGA and 
break the link between JTAG commands and the random number display. However, 
if the FPGA was left with this non-standard configuration at the end of the day, then 
JTAG commands to extract the FPGA's state would return proof of the compromise. 
If, on the other hand, the attacker returned before the day ended to reinstall the 
proper FPGA configuration, then a fresh random number would again be assigned to 
the display, and the attacker would be unable to control its value. As such, there is no 
way for an attacker to compromise the state of the voting machine, then subsequently 
return it to its proper state without being detected. The only requirement is that poll 
workers be diligent in recording the random number at the beginning of the voting 
day and verifying it at the end. Also, at the end of the day, prior to powering-off 
the machines, poll workers should use a tool to validate the FPGA configuration (see 
Section 4.3). 
To throw off suspicion, an attacker might try to issue a JTAG command that 
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addresses the random number display directly, leaving everything else in the FPGA 
alone, perhaps after returning a compromised VoteBox Nano back to its proper con-
figuration. In order to do this, the attacker would first need to pause the FPGA, 
then modify the display, then resume the FPGA. This final command will trigger our 
logic to sample the random number generator again, thus overwriting the attacker's 
desired value with a random one. 
While we are generally excluding physical attacks against the hardware, such as 
desoldering chips or replacing the motherboard in its entirely, the simplest attack 
against our system would be to simply cut the data pin between the motherboard 
and the LCD display. The display would continue showing the same number but 
would not receive commands to update it. The simplest defense is to continuously 
play an animation of some sort. If the line is cut, the animation will stop. 
The only remaining JTAG attack, then, is a denial of service attack. An attacker 
could simply hit the reset button or pull the power. When the VoteBox Nano returns 
to its operational state, it will have a fresh random number on the display. The poll 
workers could take the voting machine out of operation or they could audit the FPGA 
configuration. Again, since this requires issuing JTAG commands, this will change 
the random number. 
If a production VoteBox Nano's JTAG interface was externally available but kept 
under a tamper-sealed or key-locked door of some kind, the process of sealing and 
unsealing the door would be analogous to procedures used to manage present-day 
DRE voting systems. Also, by keeping the JTAG pins away from normal voters, this 
would help defeat simplistic denial of service attacks. 
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4.3 Verification and other attacks 
We use Xilinx's iMPACT tool to verify our FPGA configuration by examining the 
contents of the lookup tables (LUTs) and the inter-connection matrix. iMPACT 
ignores changes in the flip-flops (e.g., the CPU's registers), because they change state 
while the system is running. 
Do these limitations leave room for an attacker to hide modifications? Recall that 
the random number display is tied to the JTAG interface in VoteBox Nano. Even if 
an attacker were to issue a JTAG command to modify the FPGA's state (kept in the 
flip-flops or the external DRAM) through iMPACT, it would still change the random 
number displayed on the LCD. 
One final attack possibility might be a buffer overflow against the code running 
on the soft CPU. Since VoteBox Nano is implemented in C, it may well have buffer 
overflow vulnerabilities. Perhaps the attacker could inject malformed packets into the 
protocol spoken between the VoteBox Nano and the supervisor console and be able 
to compromise the software running on the soft CPU without triggering the random 
counter. While we did not explicitly engineer VoteBox Nano to be robust against such 
attacks, the codebase is small and simple enough to be amenable to either mechanized 
or manual code auditing. 
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Chapter 5 
Conclusion and the future work 
We have presented a minimalist FPGA-based electronic voting system with crypto-
graphically strong, end-to-end guarantees that protect the integrity of the votes. Our 
system, VoteBox Nano, is the first FPGA-based direct recording electronic (DRE) 
voting machine, which is radically different than the previous designs. 
VoteBox Nano leverages the inherent properties of an FPGA chip to generate 
truly random numbers for its cryptographic operations; therefore it offers improved 
security. Moreover, we use the JTAG interface to audit the FPGA's configuration for 
correctness at any time. Our voting machine shows a "session ID" captured from the 
true random number generator which is triggered by the JTAG data line, making a 
very simple yet effective tamper evidence mechanism. Any external observer can just 
check the session ID and make sure the design is authentic. 
Our design utilizes a parametric crypto engine (a previous work of ours) which 
runs purely on hardware and performs the heavy weight calculations such as modular 
exponentiation, without a noticeable delay. We use an off-the-shelf MicroBlaze soft 
CPU to accelerate the development process by making the debugging easier. Mi-
croBlaze talks to every other module and manages the whole system; as a result, our 
design is a hybrid of software and hardware modules. 
We tried to make our source code as short as possible (so it will be easier to 
audit and less likely to have bugs); therefore we needed to make some compromises: 
first, we used a lightweight RS232 serial port as the communication module instead 
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of ethernet; second, we dropped the replication features of VoteBox, because we don't 
have enough space on our board and third, we utilized character graphics, instead of 
full-color frame buffer. Although our user interface does not seem very sharp when 
compared to the other e-voting machines and our communication protocol is slower 
than ethernet, we are confident that our system is both very reliable and secure. Our 
source code consists of 1763 lines of code for hardware and a mere 996 lines of code 
for software. 
Future work could go in many directions. FPGAs are often used to prototype de-
signs before building custom ASICs. VoteBox Nano could well be implemented with 
a custom ASIC, eliminating the risks of JTAG tampering altogether. By prototyping 
the system first in an FPGA, we can convince ourselves that we have the right fea-
ture set before embarking on an ASIC design project (assuming it was economically 
feasible, in the first place). 
Alternatively, we could consider using a larger FPGA with more resources and a 
faster clock rate, allowing us to use full-color bitmap graphics rather than characters, 
and also allowing us to implement the networking and replication aspects of VoteBox 
that were omitted in order to fit within the smaller FPGA. Similarly, we can increase 
the encryption grade (e.g. we can use 2048-bit keys) to make the design even securer 
and/or use a faster (and inevitably larger) crypto engine for shorting the execution 
time. 
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Appendix A 
Cryptosystem details 
Public key cryptosystems (PKC) such as RSA [38], Elgamal [14], Diffie Hellman [9], 
Paillier [36] are used to communicate through an untrusted medium by two parties. 
In all PKC's, there are two keys, one public key (known by anybody) and one private 
key (only known by the owner). Public keys are used to encrypt the messages and 
verifying the signatures; on the other hand, private keys are used to decrypt the 
ciphertext and signing messages. Private and public keys are related to each other, 
however one cannot derive the private key by knowing only public key in the practical 
computation limits for adequate key lengths (1024 bits or longer). PKCs are like one 
way functions, where anyone can encrypt a message (or verify a signature), but no 
one can decrypt a ciphertext (or sign a message) without the private key. 
We choose to implement Elgamal [14] public key cryptosystem in our design, 
because of its probabilistic encryption and homomorphic properties, so that we can 
add the encrypted votes without decryption. 
A. l Elgamal encryption scheme 
Let's assume that Bob wants to send a secret message to Alice over an untrusted 
medium using Elgamal cryptosystem. We can divide the calculations into three parts: 
1. Key generation (by Alice) 
2. Encryption (by Bob) 
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3. Decryption (by Alice) 
A. 1.1 K e y genera t ion 
• Alice needs a multiplicative cyclic group G of order q with generator g (finding 
a generator in mod q is depicted in Chapter 4 of [31]). 
• She picks a random x which is smaller than q. 
• Alice calculates h = gx . 
• (G, q, g, h) are published as the public key and x is kept secret. 
A. 1.2 E n c r y p t i o n 
Bob has a secret message m to be sent to Alice. 
• Bob picks a random y smaller than q. 
• Bob calculates Ci = gy . 
• Bob also calculates "shared secret" s = h y . (s is only used for one encryption) 
• Bob converts the secret message m into an element of m' of G. 
• Bob calculates c2 = m'.s 
• Finally, he sends (c 1 ; c 2 ) ciphertext pair to Alice. 
A. 1.3 Dec ryp t ion 
Alice has received (ci, c2) and she is going to use her private key x for decryption. 
• Alice computes the shared secret s = cx = (gy)x . 
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• Alice calculates m' = C2.s~x and converts m' to m. 
The random variables (x, y) are canceled because: 
c 2 s
_ 1
 = m ' .h y . (g x y )~ 1 = m' .g x y .g~ x y = m' 
To perform the decryption, we need either the secret key y: 
x x hr x x gyr 
(gr)y -
 gry 
or random variable r: 
x x hr x x gyr _ 
{gyY ~ gry 
As can be seen from the equations above, the random variable r is as important as 
the secret key y, therefore r should be a strong (i.e. hard to predict) random number 
and must be discarded right after each session. 
A.2 Elgamal homomorphism 
Homomorphism is a mathematical property of a certain function. In PKCs, we can 
utilize homomorphism over modular arithmetic such that we can multiply or add the 
encrypted secret with a constant or with another encrypted secret, without decryp-
tion. 
Homomorphism has two types: additive and multiplicative: 
• In multiplicative homomorphic systems, the product of two ciphertexts is the 
encryption of the product of the plaintexts. 
• In additive homomorphic systems, the product of two ciphertexts is the encryp-
tion of the sum of the plaintexts. 
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We can have additive or multiplicative homomorphism according to our needs by 
placing the secret in the exponent or the base: 
E(x).E(y) = (gr\x.h^).(gr\y.h^) = (g^+r*\x.y.h^+^) 
= E(x.ymodq) (multiplicative homomorphism) 
E{gl).E{gl) = (gr\ gfh^).(g^, g\W) = (g^^\ g ^ h ^ ^ ) 
= E(g^x+v'modq) (additive homomorphism) 
gi is another generator in multiplicative cyclic group G and (x,y) are the plain-
texts. In our protocol, we make use of the additive homomorphic version. 
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Appendix B 
Xilinx Spartan-3E FPGA Structure 
We used a Xilinx Spartan-3E 500 (Figure B.2) Starter Kit to implement our design. 
Our board has following components: 
• 32 MB of DRAM and 16 MB of Flash RAM 
• 16 character by 2 lines dot-matrix LCD display 
• 4 slide switches, 4 push buttons and a rotary encoder (knob) 
• 8 LEDs 
The board has following ports: a USB port (for programming purposes only), an 
ethernet port, two RS232 ports, a standard VGA output and a PS/2 port. Simplified 
structure of an FPGA (Spartan-3E series) motherboard is depicted in Figure B.l. 
The essential elements of a modern FPGA chip are configurable logic blocks 
(CLBs). In our chip, each CLB has 2 slice-Ms (slice-memory) and 2 slice-Ls (slice-
logic). Every slice contains 16-bit SRAM which behaves like a 4-bit lookup table (i.e. 
four bits in, one bit out). Slice-M's can be utilized as 16-bit shift-register or 16-bit 
RAM. All the important resources are shown in Table B.l. More information can be 
found in Xilinx Spartan-3E user guide and data sheets [55, 54]. 
The edges of the FPGA chip are covered with IOBs (Input-Output Blocks), while 
there are several other blocks inside. The Digital Clock Manager (DCM) provides the 
clock input needed by flip-flops. There are twenty 18 bit signed hardwired multipliers 
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Figure B.l : Xilinx Spartan-3E FPGA motherboard and chip structure. 
and 18 kbit block RAMs which are placed to side by side locations. The rest of the die 
is roughly made up with interconnection matrices (not shown) that allow CLBs and 
other chip resources to be wired together. Larger logical structures can be synthesized 
by connecting multiple slices together. 
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Resource 
Equivalent gates 
CLBs 
Slice-M 
Slice-L 
Total slices 
Digital Clock Managers 
LUTs and FF 
18 bit signed multipliers 
Total Distributed RAM 
Total Block RAM 
Amount 
500k 
1164 
2328 
2328 
4656 
4 
9312 
20 
74 kbits 
360 kbits 
Table B.l : Xilinx Spartan-3E FPGA resources. 
Figure B.2 : The Xilinx Spartan-3E 500 motherboard running VoteBox Nano. 
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